Pick your role, or search the task. Every answer names the real screen, the real buttons, the plan it needs — and, honestly, what it cannot do.
An API key in two fields, then the CLI or MCP.
npm i -g @nodatachat/nodata
nodata login --email you@company.com
nodata explain # governed-transaction, capsule, grant, revoke-vs-burn …
nodata scan ./my-folder # what is sensitive here?Open a tenant, secure recovery, then install nothing — or the right-click sealer for Windows.
/signupRequest access /request-accessConsole › Install /tenant-v2/‹org›/installOne consent screen; then scan, recommend and enforce on the real files.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/connect/m365Console › Connect Google /tenant-v2/‹org›/connect/googleConsole › Connectors /tenant-v2/‹org›/connectorsTwo independent roots: 12 words, and a password-protected recovery file. Set both on day one.
Deny by default. Give the AI its own identity and allow exact columns and classifications; for everything else the decryption key is never even derived.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/agentsConsole › Register a new AI agent /tenant-v2/‹org›/agents/newAdmin mode registers the table and grants; agent mode can only use the grant it was given.
# admin: register + grant
claude mcp add nodata -- npx @nodatachat/mcp --api-key ndp_YOUR_KEY
# tools: nodata_register_table · nodata_grant · nodata_revoke
# the agent itself: only its grant
claude mcp add nodata -- npx @nodatachat/mcp --grant-token ndca-YOUR_GRANT
# tools: nodata_decide → nodata_retrieve → nodata_readLink to this answer #Scan the table, review the proposed AI exposure policy, approve it.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/ai-policyA read-only simulation over your scanned folders.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/ai-tree-reachFreeze it. Every credential it holds stops working on its next request.
nodata agent revoke crm-assistant
nodata explain revoke-vs-burnYes — the Gateway keeps your provider keys encrypted and records evidence without storing prompts.
/gatewayIn the policy composer: a default envelope, plus rules that fire on conditions. Simulate, then enforce.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/policy?view=composerA folder policy: allow-list, lifetime, open count, burn, and which options employees see when they right-click "Seal".
/tenant-v2/‹org›/signet/policies/newThe access ladder: each rung asks for more proof and unlocks higher classifications.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/policy?view=ladderLet the scan tell you: risk clusters become one-click draft policies.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/recommendationsScan a folder in the browser /scan-localDry-run first — nothing changes — then apply to the exact files listed.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/signet/policiesSweep the folder, choose what to remove, remove it.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/m365/folder-governanceThe set of rules a file travels with — lifetime, opens, device binding, watermark, burn. Policies choose envelopes; you rarely build one.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/envelopesOne by one with a role, or import from your Microsoft / Google directory.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/usersConsole › Issue new user /tenant-v2/‹org›/users/createEach employee has an allocation: which envelopes they may seal with, and their ceilings.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/usersWrite a composer rule with the condition "sender department" or "sender role".
/tenant-v2/‹org›/policy?view=composer"Disable employee" cuts every tool and every data action instantly — and it is reversible.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/toolsTool tiles at the top of "Tools for employees".
/tenant-v2/‹org›/toolsDisable, revoke allocation, revoke devices, revoke what they sent — and only then, if you must, burn the user.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/toolsConsole › Seal devices /tenant-v2/‹org›/seal-devicesConsole › Vault /tenant-v2/‹org›/vault"My deck" — shared with me, what I sent, my account and proofs.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/meConsole › Inbox /tenant-v2/‹org›/inboxJust open it. The file is decrypted locally in your browser.
Revoke it from the same screen. The next open fails.
Everything you sealed is in the vault. Find it and revoke.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/vaultConsole › Sharing control center /tenant-v2/‹org›/sharesRevoke that recipient only; everyone else keeps access.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/seal-homeNo — swap the code and keep the same link.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/vaultRevoke the device; then revoke anything sensitive it sent.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/seal-devicesRotate it — the old key dies the same second.
One seal, or all of them.
nodata revoke sl_8f2c…
nodata revoke --all --reason "laptop stolen"
nodata policy # who can reach what, right nowMost control actions are reversible. Destruction is not — that is what makes it trustworthy.
Honest limits — know them before you share.
Every open and every refusal is a signed receipt.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/sharesConsole › Decisions /tenant-v2/‹org›/decisionsConsole › Audit log /tenant-v2/‹org›/auditA CSV for the auditor; a signed ZIP for the lawyer.
/tenant-v2/‹org›/auditConsole › Proofs /tenant-v2/‹org›/proofsConsole › Digest /tenant-v2/‹org›/digestVerification is public, offline and open: signatures and a hash chain, checked in your own browser.
Read the forensic serial off the image and trace it.
Controlling costs nothing: granting, revoking and policy checks are never billed.
You pay only for governed exposure decisions.